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FULFILLING DAUBERT’S GATEKEEPING 
MANDATE THROUGH COURT-APPOINTED 
EXPERTS† 
THE HONORABLE STEPHANIE DOMITROVICH, PH.D.* 
“The idea of expert witness[es] who are not beholden to the parties 
who can provide information to judges and juries on technical issues, I 
think is a terrific opportunity worth exploring.” - Judge Richard A. Posner, 
Seventh Circuit of the U.S. Court of Appeals1 
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1  Debra Cassens Weiss, Judge Posner, Presiding at Patent Trial, Will Use Court-
Appointed Experts to Explain Terms, ABA JOURNAL (May 14, 2012, 10:30 AM), 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/posner_presiding_at_patent_trial_will_use_court-
appointed_experts_to_explai/ (quoting speech to the 7th Circuit Bar Association on May 7, 
2012). 
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INTRODUCTION 
Experts play an increasingly important role in the trial process.2  The 
average civil trial includes approximately 3.7 to 4.1 experts3 and in general, 
the testimony that experts provide at trial is influential.4  Juries find experts 
to be credible and report being influenced by the expert testimony they 
hear.5  At the same time, there is a growing trend that when parties in a 
lawsuit hire experts, juries perceive the experts’ cloaks of objectivity as 
weakened or non-existent.6  Put another way, experts lose credibility in the 
eyes of the jurors “when experts are too much of an advocate for a party.”7  
Rather than viewing experts as objective suppliers of truthful information—
information that is beyond the ken of the average juror—many jurors view 
experts as “hired guns” willing to say whatever the party paying them wants 
them to say if the compensation is enough.8  Fair or not, such a perception 
damages the justice system because it feeds into the view that verdicts can 
be bought by those with the largest purse strings.  This paper will encourage 
judges to exercise their inherent authority to appoint experts.  Federal Rule 
of Evidence (F.R.E.) 706 provides for court-appointed experts to assist 
judges in their gatekeeping role of admitting only reliable expert testimony 
for the jury to weigh in deliberation.9 
 
2  JANET COTTERILL, LANGUAGE AND POWER IN COURT: A LINGUISTIC ANALYSIS OF THE 
O.J. SIMPSON TRIAL 156 (2003). 
3  NEIL VIDMAR & VALERIE P. HANS, AMERICAN JURIES: THE VERDICT 174 (2007). 
4  See COTTERILL, supra note 2.  
5  See generally Joseph M. Hanna, Influence Your Verdict by Changing Jurors’ 
Perceptions of Expert Witnesses, Part Two, SECTION OF LITIGATION, MINORITY TRIAL 
LAWYER, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION (December 14, 2011), http://apps.americanbar.org/
litigation/committees/minority/articles/fall2011-juror-perception-witness-2.html.  
6  Id. (“[J]urors rejected experts who seemed to be ‘hired guns.’  Thirty-five percent of 
the juror respondents stated that payment of the expert by the lawyers meant that the expert 
could not be trusted to be unbiased.”). 
7  Jan Mills Spaeth & Rosalind Greene, From the Mouths of Jurors: 10 Things Jurors 
Don’t Like About Expert Witnesses, ARIZONA ATTORNEY, Mar. 2016, http://www.adjury
research.com/pdf_docs/pubs_recent/0316MouthsofJurors.pdf.  
8  Molly Treadway Johnson et al., Expert Testimony in Federal Civil Trials, A 
Preliminary Analysis, FED. JUD. CENTER 1, 5 (2000); see also Douglas Mossman, “Hired 
Guns,” “Whores,” and “Prostitutes”: Case Law References to Clinicians of Ill Repute, 27 J. 
AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY 414, 414–15 (1999). 
9  FED. R. EVID. 706; Daniel S. Fridman & J. Scott Janoe, Procedural Issues Surrounding 
Judicial Gatekeeping, THE JUDICIAL GATEKEEPING PROJECT, https://cyber.harvard.edu/
daubert/ch8.htm (last visited Sep. 19, 2016) (“The [Daubert] decision suggested that a judge 
could utilize an expert to assist her in the gatekeeping task of evaluating the complicated 
scientific methodologies of each party’s experts.  These court-appointed experts take two 
basic forms: a formal expert witness or an informal technical advisor.  To understand the 
differences between them, we must first determine which of two main sources of authority 
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In a trilogy of United States Supreme Court cases beginning in 1993 
with Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,10 the Court has 
specifically entrusted trial judges with the role of gatekeepers of expert 
testimony to ensure that unreliable evidence is kept away from jurors.11  
The Supreme Court in Kumho Tire Company, Ltd. v. Patrick Carmichael12 
“conclude[d] that the trial judge must have considerable leeway in deciding 
in a particular case how to go about determining whether particular expert 
testimony is reliable.”13  The Kumho Court further held that “[t]he 
objective . . . is to ensure the reliability and relevancy of expert testimony.  
It is to make certain that an expert, whether basing testimony upon 
professional studies or personal experience, employs in the courtroom the 
same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in 
the relevant field.”14  The Court went on to say: “[a]nd whether the specific 
expert testimony focuses upon specialized observations, the specialized 
translation of those observations into theory, a specialized theory itself, or 
the application of such a theory in a particular case, the expert’s testimony 
often will rest ‘upon an experience confessedly foreign in kind to [the 
jury’s] own.’”15  The trial judge is expected to ensure that both scientific 
and technological testimony is reliable and relevant to assist the jury in 
evaluating “whether the testimony reflects scientific, technical, or other 
specialized knowledge.”16  The Kumho Court asserted, “[i]n sum, Rule 702 
grants the district judge the discretionary authority, reviewable for its abuse, 
to determine reliability in light of the particular facts and circumstances of 
the particular case.”17 
In General Electric Co. v. Joiner,18 the Supreme Court noted that the 
Federal Rules of Evidence left “in place the ‘gatekeeper’ role of the trial 
 
the judge can use to appoint the expert.  Rule 706 of the Federal Rules of Evidence outlines 
the full set of formal procedures for using a court-appointed expert witness.”).   
10  509 U.S. 579 (1993); General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997); Kumho 
Tire v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999). 
11  Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597; see also Fridman & Janoe, supra note 9 (“The Supreme 
Court in [Daubert] expressed its confidence that judges possess the capacity to undertake the 
review of expert scientific testimony.  It also indicated that they could use neutral experts 
such as scientists to help them perform their task.”). 
12  526 U.S. 137 (1999). 
13  Id. at 152. 
14  Id.  
15  Id. at 149 (quoting Learned Hand, Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding 
Expert Testimony, 15 HARV. L. REV. 40, 54 (1901)).  
16  Id. 
17  Id. at 158. 
18  522 U.S. 136 (1997).  
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judge in screening such evidence.”19  In their gatekeeping role, trial judges 
are expected to assess the relevance and reliability of proffered expert 
evidence and reject specious or junk science to prevent confusion of 
juries.20  This evaluation process requires judges to understand various 
scientific and technical principles.  However, the “current practice and 
training of the judiciary may not sufficiently prepare [judges] to perform the 
role of scientific evaluator.”21  Expert testimony by forensic scientists can 
be both highly technical and highly persuasive.   
On the one hand, judges have admitted forensic science testimony for 
decades in such areas as fingerprinting, handwriting, bite marks, and other 
domains, both before and after the judicial gatekeeping responsibility was 
established in Daubert.22  One might argue then that judges need not 
reinvent the wheel in each case where a Daubert objection is raised to some 
item of forensic science evidence because courts have considered the 
scientific merits of this type of evidence many times before.  On the other 
hand, academicians outside of forensic science have pointed to a pervasive 
“lack of standards, research, and established error rates” in the forensic 
sciences.23  These and other concerns are detailed in a 2009 National 
Academy of Sciences (NAS) report on the state of non-DNA forensic 
sciences entitled “Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: A 
Path Forward” (NAS Report).24 
The NAS Report suggests that many assumptions and foundational 
principles in the forensic sciences have not yet been sufficiently 
demonstrated to be reliable.25  The NAS committee found that “although 
 
19  Id. at 142.  
20  Id.; see also Fridman & Janoe, supra note 9 (noting that most courts require parties 
seeking to exclude particular expert testimony to do so by motion, though some trial courts 
have interpreted Daubert to require review of expert testimony sua sponte).  
21  SHIRLEY A. DOBBIN ET AL., STATE JUST. INST., A JUDGE’S DESKBOOK ON THE BASIC 
PHILOSOPHIES AND METHODS OF SCIENCE 2 (1999). 
22  Michael J. Saks, Protecting Factfinders From Being Overly Misled, While Still 
Admitting Weakly Supported Forensic Science Into Evidence, 43 TULSA L. REV. 609 (2007). 
23  Jane Campbell Moriarty, Will History Be Servitude?: The NAS Report on Forensic 
Science and the Role of the Judiciary, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 299, 300 (2010); see also 
Jonathan J. Koehler & Michael J. Saks, Individualization Claims in Forensic Science; Still 
Unwarranted, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 1187 (2010) (arguing that “no scientific basis exists for the 
proposition that forensic scientists can ‘individualize’ an unknown marking (such as 
fingerprint, tire track, or handwriting sample) to a particular person or object to the exclusion 
of all others in the world”); Michael J. Saks & Jonathan J. Koehler, The Individualization 
Fallacy in Forensic Science Evidence, 61 VAND. L. REV. 199 (2008).   
24  NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE 
IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD (2009) [hereinafter NAS REPORT]. 
25  Id. at 7–8; see also Judge Harry T. Edwards, Presentation at the Superior Court of the 
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there are many dedicated and skilled forensic professionals, the quality of 
practice in the forensic disciplines varies widely and the conclusions 
reached by forensic practitioners are not always reliable.”26  Specifically, 
judges and lawyers reviewing this NAS Report will hopefully realize that 
the vast amount of improvement needed in the forensic science disciplines 
with regard to establishing and testing techniques and methodologies used 
“is neither pro-defense nor pro-prosecution; it is, rather, both pro-science 
and pro-justice.”27 
Most recently, the President’s Council of Advisors on Science and 
Technology (PCAST) issued a report in September 2016 following the lead 
of the NAS Report, which unveiled its study’s results on additional steps 
needed to ensure the validity of forensic science in the United States.28  
PCAST, in its letter to the President of the United States, “aimed to help 
close these gaps for a number of forensic ‘feature-comparison’ methods—
specifically, methods for comparing DNA samples, bitemarks, latent 
fingerprints, firearm marks, footwear, and hair.”29  PCAST found that two 
 
District of Columbia Conference on The Role of the Court in An Age of Developing Science 
& Technology: The National Academy of Sciences Report on Forensic Science – What it 
Means for the Bench and Bar (May 6, 2010), https://www.fd.org/docs/select-topics/
evidence/forensic-evidence/the-national-academy-of-sciences-report-on-forensic-sciences-
what-it-means-for-the-bench-and-bar.pdf?sfvrsn=4 (“Carol Henderson, Past President of the 
American Academy of Forensic Sciences, said: ‘The report identified shortcomings in 
research, education, and standards of practice in the nation’s crime labs. In-depth research 
and analysis of options leading to strategic policy and implementation plans is needed . . . . 
We have been presented with an opportunity to make forensic science serve justice even 
more reliably and effectively.  This is the time to build better ‘forensic science.’”); Jules 
Epstein, The NAS Report: An Evidence Professor’s Perspective, IT’S EVIDENT (July 2009), 
http://www.ncstl.org/evident/July,%202009%20Epstein%20SPOTLIGHT (“Nonetheless, the 
[NAS] Report’s findings call into question the degree of certainty testified to by practitioners 
of ‘soft’ forensic disciplines, the subjective pattern matching of fingerprints, ballistics, 
handwriting, tool marks, and tire and shoe print treads.  In particular, the [NAS] Report 
found an across-the-board inability to validate claims that a correspondence of features 
between crime scene evidence and a known (e.g., between a latent print left at a burglary and 
the print of a suspect) proves that the suspect was the sole possible contributor.”).  
26  Edwards, supra note 25, at 2.   
27  Harry T. Edwards & Jennifer L. Mnookin, A Wake-up Call on the Junk Science 




28  See generally PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., EXEC. OFFICE OF 
THE PRESIDENT, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, FORENSIC SCIENCE IN CRIMINAL COURTS: 
ENSURING SCIENTIFIC VALIDITY OF FEATURE-COMPARISON METHODS (2016) [hereinafter 
PCAST REPORT].   
29  Id. at x.  
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important gaps exist regarding the validity of forensic sciences in the 
United States’ legal system: “(1) the need for clarity about the scientific 
standards for the validity and reliability of forensic methods and (2) the 
need to evaluate specific forensic methods to determine whether they have 
been scientifically established to be valid and reliable.”30 
Senior Judge Harry Edwards of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. 
Circuit and Jennifer Mnookin, Dean of UCLA School of Law, opine that 
the PCAST Report “persuasively explains that expert evidence based on a 
number of forensic methods—such as bite mark analysis, firearms 
identification, footwear analysis and microscopic hair comparisons—lacks 
adequate scientific validation.”31  These scholars support PCAST’s 
“plausible, workable test for validity” which entails members of the 
forensic disciplines conducting empirical testing for error rates and 
accuracy as to conditions existing in “the real world.”32  
Forensic science practitioners will benefit from the results of such 
legitimate studies.  They will gain a better understanding of “what they do 
not know about the limits of their disciplines, and it will cause them to be 
more forthright in explaining these limits to judges and jurors.”33  By 
making strides in validity and reliability, the forensic science disciplines 
will eliminate the wide variability in “reliability, error rates, reporting, 
research foundations, general acceptability, and published material.”34  Both 
of these reports aim to make judges and lawyers aware that the levels of 
scientific development and evaluation vary substantially among forensic 
science disciplines.35  While the solution of a “long-term research agenda 
will require a thorough assessment of each of the assumptions that underlie 
forensic science techniques,” forensic practitioners “presented with a 
standardized set of realistic training materials that vary in complexity” can 
begin to address these concerns immediately.36  Although the NAS Report 
stops short of recommending a moratorium on the admissibility of forensic 
science evidence, criminal defense attorneys and others have used the report 
to argue for the exclusion of all such evidence through motions in limine 
prior to trial and the use of post-conviction relief petitions to overturn 
 
30  Id.  
31  Edwards & Mnookin, supra note 27, at 1.  
32  Id. at 3.  
33  Id. 
34  NAS REPORT, supra note 24, at 188; Edwards, supra note 25, at 12 (“Hopefully, 
better scientific research, mandatory accreditation and certification, uniform standards, better 
practices, and national oversight will cure issues of this sort.”).  
35  NAS REPORT, supra note 24, at 188.  
36  Id. at 189. 
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convictions in situations where the evidence is not excluded.  Judges have 
referenced the NAS Report in court opinions.37  At the same time, trial 
judges who consider challenges to scientific evidence will likely hear from 
well-credentialed forensic scientists that their forensic science disciplines 
do indeed rest on a solid foundation, that precedent supports admission, and 
that the technique at issue easily meets the Daubert standard.  What is a 
conscientious trial judge to do? 
Judges and lawyers are expected to play an active role in evaluating 
scientific evidence.  For centuries, common law judges and lawyers have 
valued the art of cross-examination as an essential safeguard of accuracy 
and completeness in witness testimony.38  However, due to the complexity 
and need for applying scientific principles in order to evaluate the 
methodology of experts, judges and lawyers cannot simply “hand off” 
scientific evidence to the jury to evaluate despite this traditional role of 
cross-examining experts within the adversarial process.  Somehow, trial 
judges need to acquire the requisite tools and knowledge to assess the 
reliability of the methods used by forensic scientists and other experts.39  To 
do so, they need assistance.  The Federal Rules of Evidence provide a 
wonderful, underutilized vehicle for obtaining such assistance. 
F.R.E. 706 and similarly drafted state rules provide state and federal 
judges with the authority to enlist the assistance of court-appointed 
scientific experts to provide assistance and advice on scientific and 
 
37  Tresa Baldas, Defense Counsel View Report as New Weapon, NAT’L L. J., May 11, 
2009, http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202430604696/Defense-Counsel-View-Repo
rt-as-New-Weapon; see also NAS REPORT, supra note 24, at 14.  
38  Deborah Gander, Prescription For Powerful Expert Testimony, TRIAL, May 2007, at 
40 (“Lawyers rely heavily on expert testimony to provide powerful, convincing evidence.  
Whether you’re getting ready to put your medical expert on the stand or cross-examine the 
defense expert witness, proper preparation will help you make the most of the moment.”); 
RALPH ADAM FINE, DIRECT AND CROSS-EXAMINATION OF EXPERT WITNESSES TO WIN (2005), 
adapted from RALPH ADAM FINE, THE HOW-TO-WIN TRIAL MANUAL (3d rev. ed. 2005) 
(“Wigmore called cross-examination the “great engine” for getting at the truth.  And so it is.  
It is a powerful tool because the witness understands that the jury is answering the questions 
before he or she answers.”).  
39  State and federal trial judges in Daubert jurisdictions have guidance for assessing the 
reliability of proffered expert testimony by subjecting the testimony to the following non-
exclusive, non-dispositive Daubert checklist: “(1) whether the expert’s technique or theory 
can be or has been tested—that is, whether the expert’s theory can be challenged in some 
objective sense, or whether it is instead simply a subjective, conclusory approach that cannot 
reasonably be assessed for reliability; (2) whether the technique or theory has been subject to 
peer review and publication; (3) the known or potential rate of error of the technique or 
theory when applied; (4) the existence and maintenance of standards and controls; and (5) 
whether the technique or theory has been generally accepted in the scientific community.”  
FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note. 
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technical matters.  F.R.E. 706, coupled with F.R.E. 702, allows judges to 
utilize their gatekeeping ability to the fullest extent.  Oddly, many judges 
are unaware that appointing experts would be helpful because they lack 
judicial experience with such appointments, believe the power to appoint 
experts applies in very limited circumstances,40 or think that the benefits in 
appointing an expert are outweighed by whatever costs might accrue from 
doing so.41 
F.R.E. 706 is one of the most important and underutilized rules in the 
evidence code.  Trial judges cannot count on experts, hand-selected and 
paid for by the interested parties in a lawsuit, to answer all of the queries 
about challenged scientific evidence in a neutral manner.  A better solution, 
and one that is widely used in European countries and elsewhere, is one in 
which trial judges are actively encouraged to appoint neutral experts who 
are less likely to be tempted to skew their testimony towards one side or the 
other.42 
FEATURES OF F.R.E. 706 
F.R.E. 706 permits the court sua sponte, or upon the parties’ motion, to 
enter a ruling to show cause regarding why an expert witness should not be 
court-appointed.43  The court may ask the parties for candidates and appoint 
the expert the parties have agreed upon or alternatively, the court can 
choose to select its own expert.44  An important aspect of this appointment 
process is that the expert has consented to such an appointment by the court 
and, by extension, so have the parties,45 although ultimately, F.R.E. 706 
“vests exclusive authority with the court to control the expert-selection 
 
40  JOE S. CECIL & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., COURT-APPOINTED 
EXPERTS: DEFINING THE ROLE OF EXPERTS APPOINTED UNDER FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 
706, at 20 (1993).  
41  Id. at 19–23, 80, 89.  
42  See Tom Decaigny, Inquisitorial and Adversarial Expert Examinations in the Case 
Law of the European Court of Human Rights, 5 NEW J. EUR. CRIM. L. 2, 152–66 (2014); see 
also Howard M. Erichson, Mass Tort Litigation and Inquisitorial Justice, 87 GEO. L. J. 1983, 
2005–06 (1999); Anthony Champagne et al., Are court-appointed experts the solution to the 
problems of expert testimony?, 84 JUDICATURE 178, 180 n.9 (2001) (“The use of court-
appointed experts is regularly used throughout Europe and other inquisitorial based legal 
jurisdictions throughout the world.”).  
43  FED. R. EVID. 706(a). 
44  Id.  
45  CECIL & WILLGING, supra note 40, at 67 n.155 (“We also found that judges who 
appoint experts tend to support the adversarial system and carve out exceptions for court 
appointments only by obtaining the consent of the parties or by relying on the courts’ 
traditional parens patriae to protect the interests of minors or wards of the state.”).  
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process.”46 
The expert must advise the parties of all findings the expert makes, the 
expert may be deposed by any party, the expert may be called to testify by 
the court or any party, and the expert may be cross-examined by any party, 
including the party that called the expert.47  The court-appointed expert is 
permitted to receive reasonable compensation authorized by the court.48 
Experts in both criminal and civil cases may receive joint compensation 
under the Fifth Amendment, as well as in any other civil cases “by the 
parties in the proportion and at the time that the court directs . . . . [T]he 
compensation is then charged like other costs.”49  The court may exercise its 
authority to notify the jury that the court appointed an expert.50  Moreover, 
F.R.E. 706 does not prevent the parties from calling their own experts.51 
The Advisory Committee (Committee) at the time of F.R.E. 706’s 
adoption intended this rule to address the pressing concern of expert 
shopping—specifically, the perception of experts as hired guns and the 
hesitancy of experts to be a part of a contentious case in court.52 Although 
the Committee acknowledged that court-appointed experts “acquire an aura 
of infallibility to which they are not entitled . . .,” the Committee cited to an 
increasing trend of using experts as provided in F.R.E. 706.53  The 
Committee viewed the mere “possibility that the judge may appoint an 
expert in a given case [as] a sobering effect on the expert witness of a party 
and upon the person utilizing his services.”54  The Committee also 
recognized that trial judges have the inherent power to appoint experts of 
their own choosing.55 
 
46  Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 595 (1993) (“Rule 706 
allows the court in its discretion to procure the assistance of an expert of its own choosing.”); 
John P. McCahey & Jonathan M. Proman, Federal Rule of Evidence 706: Court-Appointed 
Experts, SECTION OF LITIGATION, TRIAL EVIDENCE, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION (Jun. 30, 
2011), http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/trialevidence/articles/summer2011-
rule-706-court-appointed-experts.html; see also FED. R. EVID. 706(a).   
47  FED. R. EVID. 706(b). 
48  FED. R. EVID. 706(c). 
49  FED. R. EVID. 706(c)(2). 
50  FED. R. EVID. 706(d). 
51  FED. R. EVID. 706(e) (noting that this rule does not prevent a party from calling its 
own expert witness). 
52  FED. R. EVID. 706 advisory committee’s note. 
53  Id.  
54  Id. 
55  Id.; see also John M. Sink, The Unused Power of a Federal Judge to Call His Own 
Expert Witnesses, 29 S. CAL. L. REV. 195 (1956). 
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CHALLENGES EXPERTS POSE IN THE ADVERSARIAL SYSTEM 
F.R.E. 706 is a particularly important evidentiary rule in the United 
States and can make “potentially important inroads into the adversarial 
system . . . .”56  The United States adversarial legal system runs into a 
significant roadblock when proffered evidence is beyond the ken of the 
average judge or juror.57  Rather than seeking the “best” experts, the United 
States adversarial legal system implicitly encourages parties to seek experts 
whose views fall at the extreme ends of the scientific continuum on any 
given issue.  The end result is that in many cases, inexperienced judges and 
factfinders hear two very different sides of a complex scientific matter and 
are left to resolve a dispute that, apparently, the scientific community itself 
has not resolved.58 
Unfortunately, this situation can arise even when a particular scientific 
issue is resolved to the satisfaction of the broader scientific community, but 
there are a few available experts for hire “who still have reservations on the 
matter.”59  Indeed, the adversarial nature of the United States legal system 
has been imputed for pulling in scientists from opposite ends of the 
spectrum.60  Even where opposing experts are not accused of being 
charlatans or liars, experts are frequently accused of being little more than 
hired guns who tilt their certainties and uncertainties in the direction 
favored by the side that hired them.61  This means that the value of the 
expert testimony cancels out, or the factfinder inadvertently places too 
much credence on the expert “whose forensic skills are the more 
enticing.”62 
 
56  Richard A. Posner, What is Obviously Wrong with the Federal Judiciary, Yet 
Eminently Curable, 19 GREEN BAG 2D 187, 192 (2016); see also CECIL & WILLGING, supra 
note 40, at 94–95.  
57  Posner, supra note 56, at 190 (“A big problem with jury trials is that often they 
involve technological or commercial issues that few jurors understand (not many judges 
understand either) and that the lawyers and witnesses are unable or unwilling to dumb down 
to a level that the jurors would understand.”). 
58  NAS REPORT, supra note 24; see also HANDBOOK OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 
STUDIES 506–26 (Sheila Jasanoff, Gerald E. Markle, James C. Petersen & Trevor Pinch eds., 
rev. ed. 1995).  
59  Susan Haack, Of Truth, in Science and in Law, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 985, 1002 (2008). 
60  Id. 
61  Memorandum from John Blume, Cornell Law School, An Overview of Significant 
Findings From the Capital Jury Project and Other Empirical Studies of the Death Penalty 
Relevant to Jury Selection, Presentation of Evidence and Jury Instructions in Capital Cases, 
Cornell Law School, at 35 (2008), http://www.learningace.com/doc/1830081/bd00c614
e08e48aa367ae5dda404a424/empirical-studies-summaries-revised-spring-2010. 
62  John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 54 U. CHI L. REV. 823, 
836 (1985). See generally John H. Langbein, Historical Foundations of the Law of Evidence: 
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SENTIMENT FOR NEUTRAL EXPERTS 
Although F.R.E. 706 is infrequently used by trial judges, sentiment in 
favor of neutral experts is strong among legal scholars and “giants” such as 
U.S. Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer.  Justice Breyer noted that in 
order for us to “build legal foundations that are sound in science as well as 
the law . . . .”63  Professor David Faigman of University of California, 
Hastings College of the Law, who co-authored the treatise “Modern 
Scientific Evidence,” argues that “[h]aving an expert from the field to 
discuss the complexities of the science greatly should improve judges’ 
comprehension of the research and relieve their fears of making a holding 
or writing an opinion that delves deeply into the subject.”64 Faigman 
suggests that the judiciary could benefit from the example provided by 
administrative agencies, which routinely use and rely on scientific advisory 
boards and related forms of institutionalized technical support.65  Likewise, 
Professor Sheila Jasanoff in Science at the Bar argues for a variety of 
incremental relief methods to assist the court, such as the use of court-
appointed experts to improve the United States legal system’s ability to 
handle the increasing use of science and technology expert testimony in 
courtrooms.66  Judge Richard A. Posner of the Seventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals has also published a piece in favor of increased use of court-
appointed “neutral” experts.67  Tahirih V. Lee, Associate Professor at 
Florida State University College of Law, contends that neutral experts are 
viewed as “less susceptible to pressure . . . to tailor their testimony to 
support a particular legal outcome than are partisan experts whose fees are 
paid by parties with a vested interest in the legal outcome.”68 
 
A View from the Ryder Sources, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1168 (1996). 
63  See, e.g., Champagne et al., supra note 42, at 179 n.6 (citing to a variety of scholars 
arguing in favor of court-appointed experts); Zhuhao Wang, An Alternative to the 
Adversarial: Studies on Challenges of Court-appointed Experts, 2 J. FORENSIC SCI. MED. 28, 
32 (2016).  
64  David L. Faigman, The Law’s Scientific Revolution: Reflections and Ruminations on 
the Law’s Use of Experts in Year Seven of the Revolution, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 661, 
668–69 (2000). 
65  DAVID L. FAIGMAN, LEGAL ALCHEMY: THE USE AND MISUSE OF SCIENCE IN THE LAW 
200 (1999). 
66  SHEILA JASANOFF, SCIENCE AT THE BAR: LAW, SCIENCE, AND TECHNOLOGY IN 
AMERICA 221–22 (1995).  
67  Posner, supra note 57, at 190. 
68  Tahirih V. Lee, Court Appointed Experts and Judicial Reluctance: A Proposal to 
Amend Rule 706 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 6 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 480, 493 (1988). 
2. DOMITROVICH (UPDATED 12.23.16) 12/23/2016  11:14 AM 
46 DOMITROVICH [Vol. 106 
VALIDATION FROM THE COURTS 
Support for trial judges appointing experts has come from the highest 
levels of our appellate court process, including the Supreme Court.  In his 
concurring opinion in General Electric Co. v. Joiner, Justice Breyer noted 
that while judges are expected as gatekeepers to make sure “‘all scientific 
testimony and evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable’ . . . . 
[J]udges are not scientists and do not have the scientific training that can 
facilitate the making of such decisions.”69  Because a lack of expertise does 
not excuse judges from their gatekeeper responsibilities, Justice Breyer 
referred to “techniques” such as Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 16’s 
pre-trial conference authority and the ability to appoint special masters and 
hire specially trained law clerks as means to assist judges in the selection of 
impartial expert assistance to the courts.70  Justice Breyer discussed relevant 
portions of F.R.E. 706 and referenced a well-known treatise writer and 
federal judge, Judge Jack Weinstein of the Eastern District of New York, 
who asserts that “a court should sometimes ‘go beyond the experts 
proffered by the parties’ and ‘utilize its powers to appoint independent 
experts under Rule 706 . . . .’”71 
Federal appellate court judges have long recognized the value of court-
appointed experts by remanding cases to trial judges with instructions to 
appoint neutral experts.72  For example, in Eastern Air Lines v. McDonnell 
Douglas Corp.,73 the experts for each party had divergent views.74 The Fifth 
Circuit noted that the jury could benefit from the testimony of a neutral 
expert due to “[t]he unusual difficulty of estimating a major airline’s lost 
profits resulting from extensive delays stretching over a period of three 
years and involving 90 jet aircraft . . . .”75  The court discussed the 
objectivity of a court-appointed expert: “[b]ecause a court-appointed 
 
69  General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 147–48 (1997) (quoting Daubert v. 
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993)) (“This requirement will 
sometimes ask judges to make subtle and sophisticated determinations about scientific 
methodology and its relation to the conclusions an expert witness seeks to offer—
particularly when a case arises in an area where the science itself is tentative or uncertain, or 
where testimony about general risk levels in human beings or animals is offered to prove 
individual causation.”) (Breyer, J., concurring).  
70  Id. at 149 (citing CECIL & WILLGING, supra note 40, at 783–88). 
71  Joiner, 522 U.S. at 150 (quoting J. WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN MASS TORT 
LITIGATION 116 (1995)).  
72  Champagne et al., supra note 42, at 179 (noting that there has been a call for court-
appointed experts for at least a century). 
73  532 F. 2d 957 (5th Cir. 1976). 
74  Id. at 965.  
75  Id. at 1000.  
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witness could be unconcerned with either promoting or attacking a 
particular estimate of Eastern’s damages, he could provide an objective 
insight into the $24.5 million difference of opinion between the parties’ 
experts.”76  The Fifth Circuit further stated that “the mere presence of a 
neutral expert may have, in Judge Prettyman’s words, ‘a great tranquilizing 
effect on the experts retained by Eastern and McDonnell.’”77 
In Walker v. American Home Shield Long Term Disability Plan,78 the 
Ninth Circuit found that the trial court was within its discretion to appoint a 
medical expert sua sponte under F.R.E. 706(a).79  Although counsel argued 
that the court’s additional evidence was not necessary, the circuit court 
recognized the trial court’s need to select an expert when evaluating 
evidence on a difficult to define disease with unknown origins.80  The 
appellate court viewed this case as presenting the trial court judge with the 
“appropriate occasion” to appoint an independent expert to assist him in 
evaluating contradictory evidence because the court found the contradictory 
evidence concerning fibromyalgia “confusing and conflicting.”81 
Forensic science appears to be an area that would benefit from greater 
use of court-appointed experts due to the specialized nature of the 
procedures used as well as the controversy that now surrounds even the 
most venerable of the forensic areas (e.g., fingerprints).82  Although such 
appointments are rare, it is worth noting that the district court judge in 
Genentech, Inc. v. Boehringer Mannheim83 carefully acknowledged the 
valuable use of court-appointed experts who provided her with “excellent 
tutorials” to assist her in understanding basic molecular genetics and 
recombinant DNA technology.84 
  
 
76  Id.  
77  Id. (quoting Proceedings of the Seminar on Protracted Cases for United States Circuit 
and District Judges, 21 F.R.D. 395, 469 (1957)).  
78  180 F.3d 1065 (9th Cir. 1999). 
79  Walker, 180 F.3d at 1071. 
80  Id. at 1071.  
81  Id.  
82  Ralph Norman Haber & Lynn Haber, Experimental Results of Fingerprint 
Comparison Validity and Reliability: A Review and Critical Analysis, 54 SCI & JUST. 375, 
384–86 (2014) (arguing that studies on the accuracy and reliability of fingerprint analysis are 
inapplicable to fingerprint casework). 
83  47 F. Supp. 2d 91 (1999). 
84  Id. at 94.  
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CONCLUSION 
Judges and lawyers need not become scholars in every area of science 
and technology in order to argue and rule on motions involving scientific 
evidence issues.  Instead they must become “sophisticated consumers of 
science” who are capable of understanding the core issues related to 
disputed evidence.85  Toward this end, gatekeeping judges who must 
ultimately decide the admissibility of disputed scientific and technical 
evidence under F.R.E. 702 need expert assistance.  F.R.E. 706 provides that 
assistance in the form of authority to appoint neutral experts.  Europeans 
have long valued the important role that court-appointed experts play in 
their judicial process to the point that they disfavor a court process 
considered adversarial in nature with hired gun experts.86  By appointing 
experts to assist in understanding scientific evidence like European nations, 
United States judges—both federal and state—can improve the public’s 
confidence in the independence of our judiciary.  The increased use of 
court-appointed experts will move the United States adversarial legal 
system closer to its goal of providing an objective, impartial forum to 
litigants while promoting the integrity and independence of the judiciary, 
which is priceless. 
 
85  FAIGMAN, supra note 65, at 88. 
86  See, e.g., C. Stavrianos, C. Papadopoulos, L. Vasiliadis, A. Pantazis & A. Kokkas, 
The Role of Expert Witness in the Adversarial English and Welsh Legal System, 5 RES. J. 
MED. SCI. 4, 5–6 (2011); Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, supra note 
62, at 823 (arguing Germany’s tradition of making extensive use of court-appointed rather 
than party-retained experts shows the advantages of these practices); see also EUROPEAN 
COMM’N FOR THE EFFICIENCY OF JUSTICE (CEPEJ), GUIDELINES ON THE ROLE OF COURT-
APPOINTED EXPERTS IN JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS OF COUNCIL OF EUROPE’S MEMBER STATES 14 
(2014), https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?p=&id=2278707&Site=&direct=true#P187_15373 
(discussing the appointment criteria for experts in sections 3.1–3.3); Champagne et al., supra 
note 42, at 180 n.9 (“The use of court-appointed experts is regularly used throughout Europe 
and other inquisitorial based legal jurisdictions throughout the world.”).  
